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From the Editor
I am proud to introduce a new issue of Connections.  In this issue you can find articles on: structural 
balance in signed networks (Doreian and Mrvar); operationalising oligarchic networks as rich clubs 
(Ansell, Bichir, Zhou); the use of experiments in social exchange networks (Neuhofer, Reindl and 
Kittel); Tom Valente’s keynote on network influences on behaviour (Dyal); description of a dataset from 
a network exchange experiment (Skvoretz); and the description of a dataset from a health promotion 
study (Gesell and Tesdahl).  
In the last few years we have introduced a section on datasets, codebooks and data collection methods 
(DEN); state of the art reviews; and the professionalization of the production process with the assignment 
of DOI numbers and copyright agreements with authors.  Beyond our regular call for original research 
articles, I would like to invite submissions on network research design as a new section to the journal. 
Of particular interest are studies where the use of novel research designs reflect on the choice between 
alternative models.
The journal is moving towards distributed editorship, emulating the model adopted by Network Science 
as most pertinent for an interdisciplinary audience.  We will shortly circulate the list of area specific 
editors.
We are looking forward to your suggestions and feedback at Sunbelt and via email.  We are organising a 
short reception on Wednesday the 6th of April at 8pm at the Presidential Suite of the Marriot Hotel (i.e. 
the Hospitality Suite) and we would like to invite all authors, potential authors and friends of the journal 
to come and meet the Editorial Board.
Dimitris Christopoulos
Editor, Connections
www.dimitriscc.wordpress.com
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Who Says Networks, Says Oligarchy? Oligarchies as “Rich Club” Networks
Abstract
Departing from Roberto Michels’s classic analysis of oligarchy, we provide a structural analysis of the concept based 
on social network analysis. We define oligarchy as a social network that exhibits three structural properties: tight 
interconnections among a small group of prominent actors who form an “inner circle”; the organization of other actors 
in the network through the intermediation of this inner circle; and weak direct connections among the actors outside 
the inner circle. We treat oligarchy as a global property of social networks and offer an approach for measuring the 
oligarchical tendencies of any social network. Our main contribution is to operationalize this idea using a “rich club” 
approach. We demonstrate the efficacy of this approach by analyzing and comparing several urban networks: Sao 
Paulo urban infrastructure networks and Los Angeles and Chicago transportation policy networks.
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Oligarchies as “Rich Club” Networks
1. Introduction
The concept of oligarchy has a long history in the 
social sciences and in the popular imagination, from 
Aristotle’s description of oligarchy as rule by the few, 
to Roberto Michel’s “Iron Law of Oligarchy,” to the 
colloquial description of post-Soviet capitalist grandees 
as “oligarchs.” The term has various connotations in the 
social sciences, from the “bureaucratic conservatism” 
of social movements (Voss and Sherman 2000), to the 
control of the economy by “industrial tycoons” (Guriev 
and Rachinsky 2005), to the domination of politics by 
“major producers” (Acemoglu 2008). Most of these 
references, however, share the idea that an oligarchy is 
a regime controlled by cooperation or collusion among a 
small group of powerful elites. 
 Given the long history and ubiquitous use of 
the idea of oligarchy and the potential importance of 
oligarchical control over social movements, economies, 
and political systems, it is surprising that there is so little 
theoretical and empirical attention paid to the concept 
of oligarchy. Many authors make reference, of course, 
to Roberto Michels’s work, Political Parties, which 
provides the classic theoretical treatment of the concept. 
But since the publication of this important work in 1910, 
there has been limited theoretical analysis of the concept 
of oligarchy. Taking Michels’s claim that oligarchies 
were inevitable seriously, subsequent scholarship has 
mostly sought to identify the conditions under which 
organizations and social movements do not become 
oligarchical (Lipset, Trow, and Coleman 1977; Voss and 
Sherman 2000). In this paper we build on, but go beyond 
Michels’s classic treatment by analyzing the structural 
bases of oligarchy, which we operationalize using social 
network analysis. We treat oligarchy as a global property 
of social networks and offer an approach for measuring 
the oligarchical tendencies of any social network.
 We begin by briefly reviewing Roberto Michels’s 
classic analysis of oligarchy, pointing to how it provides 
the basis for our own structural analysis. A protégé of Max 
Weber’s, Michels analyzed the development of oligarchy 
in complex bureaucratic organizations. His central 
insight was a synthesis of the “elite theory” of fellow 
Italians Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto with Weber’s 
expectation that modern bureaucracy could become an 
“iron cage.” He argued that organizational differentiation 
and stratification produced a distinctive, self-perpetuating 
elite (“Who says organization, says oligarchy”). Though 
formally sovereign, the “masses” were unable to organize 
themselves and as a result become dependent on the elite 
group to direct them. While the elite group is composed 
of a stable “inner circle” that monopolizes control 
over organizational offices, the average member has a 
narrow and unstable relationship with the organization. 
Consequently, the elite’s advantages allow them to 
transform their “inner circle” into a “closed caste.” This 
closure is essential if elites are to prevent a challenge to 
their position by the rank-and-file. In sum, an oligarchy 
has three aspects: the elite are tightly interconnected 
among themselves, forming an “inner circle”; the masses 
are organized through the intermediation of this inner 
circle; and the masses are poorly interconnected among 
themselves.
 Literature in the Michelsian tradition has focused 
on the organizational aspects of oligarchy.1 By contrast, 
we focus on the relational character of oligarchy, as it 
might develop within a social network. A social network 
perspective has two important advantages for the study of 
oligarchy. First, it frees us from the confines of a single 
organization and allows us to examine how relationships 
might structure the organization of elites spanning 
organizational or institutional boundaries (see Marques 
(2000, 2003, 2008, and 2012) on the permeability of the 
“State fabric”2). Second, a social network perspective 
may be used to capture the informal relational basis of 
oligarchy—the proverbial ‘old boys network.’
 An earlier generation of scholars made much 
the same argument and closely dissected the structure of 
relationships among “ruling elites” (Hunter 1953, Mills 
1956, Dumhoff 1967). But this scholarship got bogged 
down in debates between “elite theorists” and “pluralists” 
(Polsby 1960, Dahl 1961). Although this debate generated 
new insights, it tended to be structured in dichotomous 
terms as an issue of whether or not a ruling elite existed. 
In the 1970s, work in this tradition shifted its attention 
to one specific type of network—“interlocks” between 
the boards of corporations. As this corporate interlock 
literature developed, it increasingly focused on how links 
1 See Leach (2005) for a review and critique. He defines oligarchy as the “concentration of entrenched illegitimate authority and/or influence 
in the hands of a minority...” (2005, 329).
2 This concept refers to the relational patterns formed by both institutional and personal relationships that structure state organizations. 
According to Marques: “The state fabric is created and changed by networks among people and organizations, both inside the state and in the 
larger environment of policy communities. The contacts are both personal and institutional and are based in old and new ties, constantly re-
created. These midlevel structures control several resources and affect preferences, restrict choices and strategies, and change political results” 
(2012, 33).
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between corporate boards shaped the flow of influence 
and resources between them (Mizruchi 1996). These 
studies usefully widened the discussion of the role of 
corporate interlocks, but also gradually shifted attention 
away from the regime-like characteristics of interlocking 
directorates.
 We have no interest in resurrecting the old elite-
pluralist debate. Our relational approach to oligarchy 
suggests that the structure of social networks is likely 
to affect the flow of information, the distribution of 
resources, patterns of decision-making and influence. 
But to be clear, a structural analysis of networks alone 
does not provide sufficient behavioral evidence that a 
ruling elite monopolizes power and influence; it can only 
demonstrate that the relational basis for such control or 
influence exists. In addition, as our analysis will show, 
we depart from the more dichotomous inclinations of the 
elite-pluralist debate, focusing instead on how to measure 
oligarchical tendencies in networks.
 Why is a relational concept of oligarchy useful? 
One way to approach this question is through the idea of 
brokerage.  Brokerage is a form of intermediation where a 
focal actor, the broker, mediates the relationship between 
some other set of actors.  Social network analysis has a 
well-established tradition examining this brokerage role 
(Simmel 1950; Gould and Fernandez 1989; Burt 2005; 
Obstfeld 2005; Stovel and Staw 2012). The focus of this 
tradition has been to understand the position and power of 
individual brokers, and the advantages that accrue to them 
or those they connect.  However, in many cases, it is also 
interesting or valuable to understand the collective pattern 
of mediation in a network.  The concept of oligarchy, we 
suggest, points to the collective mediation of a network 
by a small but cohesive subgroup. To explain this point, 
recall the three aspects of oligarchy that we drew from 
Michels: the elite are tightly interconnected among 
themselves, forming an “inner circle”; the “masses” 
are organized through the intermediation of this inner 
circle; and the masses are poorly interconnected among 
themselves. An oligarchy describes a network where a 
cohesive subgroup monopolizes the intermediation of 
relationships in the network as a whole. As in the work on 
individual brokerage, Michels suggests that advantages 
accrue to the inner circle. But the concept of oligarchy is 
about the collective, rather than individual intermediation 
of the network.
 Pure oligarchies may rarely exist. Nevertheless, 
many kinds of social networks may have oligarchical 
tendencies.  It is well established in the social network 
literature that some nodes are often much more central 
than others and that these central nodes may play an 
important brokerage role, often by spanning “structural 
holes” in the network. We also know that subgroups form 
within networks, often among well-connected actors, and 
that networks often exhibit center-periphery patterns. 
Work on “small world” networks has also found that 
a small group of “hubs” can link a sparsely connected 
network together (Watts 1999). When taken together, 
these findings suggest the possibility for cohesive 
subgroups to dominate or monopolize the intermediation 
of the network as a whole.  It is more useful, however, 
to understand the degree to which a social network is 
collectively intermediated than to become fixated on 
whether or not a network has a ruling elite. 
 In the following section, we develop a strategy for 
measuring the oligarchical tendencies of a network using 
a “distribution of degree” approach. In later sections of 
the paper, we demonstrate the value of this approach by 
analyzing several social networks.
2. Three Network Metrics
 How should we identify the tendency of a social 
network to be oligarchical? The tool kit of social network 
analysis offers several possibilities. In this paper, we 
introduce a method based on work in physics and 
computer science that focuses on how ties are distributed 
across the network. We use the concept of “rich clubs” 
(Zhou and Mondragón 2004; Zhou and Mondragón 2007, 
Mondragón and Zhou 2009) as our basic measure of the 
oligarchical tendencies of a network, and supplement 
it with an analysis of the “mixing properties” of 
networks (Newman 2002) and the degree distribution 
of ties (Barabasi and Albert 1999). Taken together, 
these measures identify the tendency of social networks 
to exhibit the key features of oligarchy that we have 
identified: the existence of a small, cohesive group that 
monopolizes the intermediation of the rest of the network. 
2.1 Power-Law Degree Distribution 
Many real networks – especially large and complex ones 
– may display a skewed degree distribution known as the 
“power law,” or P(k) ~ k -Y , where degree k is defined 
as the number of links a node has (Barabási and Albert, 
1999; Xu, Zhang and Small, 2010). A power-law network 
is called ‘scale-free’ because it is not the average degree, 
but the exponent of the power-law distribution, that 
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characterizes the network’s connectivity.3
 In a power-law network, most nodes have only a 
few links, and the network is guaranteed to have a small 
set of nodes with very high degrees, order(s) of magnitude 
higher than the average degree expected from a random 
process. Thus, for power-law networks, it is particularly 
important to examine the role of the high-degree nodes in 
organizing the network’s global structure.
2.2 Network Mixing Patterns
Newman (2002) identified different mixing patterns in 
networks. A network is assortative if nodes of similar 
degrees tend to be connected to one another and 
disassortative if nodes tend to be connected to nodes 
of different degrees. To measure these different mixing 
patterns, Newman proposed the assortative coefficient r, 
which ranges from -1 to 1. When r = 1, there is perfect 
assortative mixing in the network, i.e., every link connects 
two nodes with the same degree; when r = -1, there is a 
perfect disassortative network, i.e., every link connects 
two nodes with different degrees; when r = 0, there is a 
neutral mixing network.
2.3 Rich-Club Coefficient
The “rich club” concept proposed by Zhou and Mondragon 
(2004, 2007 and 2009) complements this discussion of 
network mixing patterns. In doing so, it addresses the 
following ambiguities. For example, if a network displays 
assortative mixing where high-degree nodes tend to link 
with other high-degree nodes, does this mean the high-
degree nodes are tightly (or fully) interconnected with 
each other? Or, if a network is disassortative and high-
degree nodes (on average) tend to link with low-degree 
nodes, does this mean the high-degree nodes do not link 
with themselves at all?
 “Rich” nodes are defined as a group of nodes 
with the highest degrees in a network, specified either 
as the top n best-connected nodes or as the nodes with 
degrees larger than or equal to a given degree k. For a 
given group of rich nodes, any member of the group has 
a degree higher than or equal to any node outside the 
group. More nodes with lower degrees are included when 
the size of the group increases.
3 This property derives from two main mechanisms of the power-law networks identified by Barabási and Albert (1999, p.509): (i) networks 
expand continuously by the addition of new vertices, and (ii) new vertices attach preferentially to sites that are already well connected. In other 
words, the authors showed that large networks self-organize into a scale-free state, a feature unpredicted by previous random network models.
4 The maximum possible number of links among n nodes is n(n-1)/2.
5 When the group of rich nodes is given by the node rank n, the most exclusive group contains only the top 2 best-connected nodes (n=2), and 
the largest group is the whole network (n=N). When the group is given by degree k, the smallest group has nodes with k=kmax where kmax is 
the largest degree in the network, and the largest group contains all nodes with k >= 1.
 The rich-club coefficient Ø is defined as the ratio 
of the actual number of links to the maximum possible 
number of links among a group of rich nodes (Zhou and 
Mondragon 2004, 2007).4 It is a quantitative measure of 
the density of connectivity among a given group of rich 
nodes. When Ø=1, the rich nodes are fully interconnected, 
forming a clique. When Ø=0, the rich nodes have no direct 
link among themselves (although each of them may have 
a large number of links with nodes outside the group). 
 For simplicity, a network is said to contain a rich 
club if the richest nodes (e.g. the top 5% best-connected 
nodes) have a high value rich-club coefficient (say, Ø 
> 0.5). No a priori definition exists to determine which 
nodes are in the rich club. The rich-club coefficient is 
usually calculated for all groups of rich nodes so that this 
structural property can be examined across all levels of 
network hierarchy.5 The rich-club coefficient has been 
found to be critically relevant to the redundancy and 
robustness of a network (Zhou and Mondragón 2004b) 
and to its routing efficiency in terms of shortest paths 
between nodes (Zhou 2009). 
 Zhou and Mondragon (2007) shows that a 
network’s rich-club coefficient is not trivially related 
with the network’s degree distribution or mixing 
pattern. For example, networks having exactly the same 
degree distribution can have a vastly different rich-club 
coefficient; and high-degree nodes in an assortative 
network are not necessarily more interconnected than 
those in a disassortative network.
2.4 Debate on the Rich-Club Phenomenon
There has been a debate on the rich-club phenomenon with 
respect to how to determine whether the rich nodes in a 
network show a tendency to form a tightly interconnected 
club. Colizza et al. (2006) propose to compare the rich-
club coefficient of a real network against a null model 
defined as the average of a maximally randomized 
version of the real network. The logic here is analogous 
to the difficulty of determining whether a person is “tall” 
or “short” without comparing their height to the average 
height of the group of people that the person belongs to. 
One “surprising” result is that the Internet (AS graph), 
which is considered to exemplify a strong rich-club 
phenomenon, would have a slightly lower rich-club 
Connections
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coefficient when the network is randomly rewired (while 
preserving the original degree distribution). However, 
this method cannot be used to compare between different 
real networks – because a “short” person on a basketball 
team may be taller than a “tall” person in a primary school 
class. 
 Amaral and Guimera (2006) relate the rich-club 
phenomenon to a monotonic increase of the rich-club 
coefficient as a function of degree. They conjecture that 
the monotonic increase may be “a natural consequence of 
a stochastic process” and comment that “… an oligarchy 
will always appear to be present, even if the network 
is random.” However, it is widely known that the rich-
club coefficient is not a monotonic function in most real 
networks (McAuley et al 2007; Opsahl et al 2008). The 
rich-club coefficient can even be a bell-shaped function 
in some networks (Zhou and Mondragon 2007). 
 Mondragon and Zhou (2007) argue that the rich-
club coefficient is an absolute measure of the density 
of interconnectivity among a group of rich nodes. It is 
calculated without any assumption and judgment about 
the rich-club phenomenon. In other words, it is measuring 
a person’s height without judging whether a person is 
tall or not. In this paper we use the rich-club coefficient 
as a network metric and avoid referring to the rich-club 
phenomenon. 
3. Oligarchy as a Global Property of Networks
Assortative mixing is common in social networks, but is 
not associated with “oligarchical” networks. An oligarchy 
is a rich club with disassortative mixing. In other words, 
the “rich” nodes are interconnected, but they are also 
connected to the “poor” nodes who are not strongly 
interconnected among themselves.
 The idea that the power of well-connected 
people is derived from their connections to other well-
connected people is well established in social network 
analysis, and typically measured using eigenvector 
centrality (Bonacich 1972) or, in a form that allows you 
to vary the relative importance of indirect ties, “power 
centrality” (Bonacich 1987). One difficulty with the 
later measure, however, is that it requires an arbitrary 
decision on the part of the analyst about whether people 
gain more power by being tied to other “rich” nodes or by 
being tied to more “impoverished” nodes. Following this 
tradition of measuring centrality and power in networks, 
some authors have recently developed new measures 
for identifying “leadership insularity” (Abersman 
& Christakis, 2010) or “organizational influentials” 
(Cole and Weiss, 2009).6 Similarly, classic strategies of 
detecting cohesive subgroups (Wasserman and Faust 
1994), such as clique analysis and its variants, or newer 
methods of “community detection,” such as the Girvan-
Newman method (Newman 2004) may be quite useful for 
identifying the “inner circles” of oligarchies. 
 The rich-club approach has a different focus 
and purpose than these techniques. First, it expands 
the analytical focus beyond identifying well-connected 
leaders or important subgroups. “Rich” nodes form 
a cohesive group among themselves, but they also 
maintain ties to more “impoverished” nodes—e.g., their 
clients. It is these ties with non-rich nodes that makes 
rich nodes “rich.” Second, the rich-club approach aims to 
characterize the oligarchical tendency of entire networks 
as opposed to identifying the oligarchs themselves.
 The rich-club approach uses the “mixing 
properties” of the network to evaluate whether rich 
nodes merely affiliate among themselves, or whether 
they also affiliate with non-rich nodes. If a network is 
“assortative,” rich nodes affiliate primarily with other 
rich nodes, while non-rich nodes affiliate primarily with 
other non-rich nodes (in an assortative network, nodes of 
similar degree associate with each other). If a network is 
“dissassortative,” by contrast, nodes of dissimilar degree 
associate together. While the “rich club” measure captures 
the way a core group monopolizes ties, the disassortative 
measure guarantees that this core is not segmented off 
from the rest of the network.  
 In addition to knowing that there is a group of 
rich nodes who are tied together, but also linked to a 
wider network of clients, the concept of oligarchy also 
presumes that the “rich club” at the core of the network 
is small relative to the network as a whole. One way to 
evaluate whether the “rich club” is small is to examine 
the degree distribution of the network. If the rich-club 
is small, we should expect the degree distribution to 
resemble a power law.
 To summarize, an oligarchical network can be 
characterized as having a “rich club” (a group of well-
connected nodes who are connected to one another), 
but the overall network exhibits mixing properties that 
are disassortative (where each rich node is strongly 
connected to the poor nodes) and a power-law degree 
distribution (few well-connected nodes and many poorly-
connected nodes). Taken together, these three properties 
capture the degree to which a small group dominates the 
collective intermediation of the network as a whole. In 
6 Looking for the most influential individuals in school networks, Cole and Weiss (2009, 4) propose four methods: 1) absolute cut score (in-
degree score); 2) fixed percentage of population is defined as influential; 3) degree standard deviation; 4) random permutation.
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Michels’ terms, the rich club is a cohesive “inner circle” 
that organizes the weakly organized “masses.” 
 One alternative way to identify an oligarchical 
network regime is to develop a core-periphery analysis. 
Much like the concept of an oligarchy, a core-periphery 
structure is a “core” of people who are tied together and 
a “periphery” of less well connected actors (Laumann 
and Pappi 1976).  Breiger describes a core-periphery 
network as follows: “a coherent set of active members (or 
a “leading crowd”) is surrounded by isolated individuals 
who have interchange both to and from them” (1979, 
29). Consistent with this definition, Borgatti and Everett 
(1999) developed a partitioning algorithm for analyzing 
core-periphery structure that assigns those who are 
closely connected to each other (1-block) to the “core” 
and those who are not connected to each other (0-block) 
to a “periphery.” They then develop a “fitness measure” to 
evaluate how closely the derived assignment corresponds 
with an idealized core-periphery structure.  However, 
there are several limitations of using a core-periphery 
analysis as measure of oligarchy:  
1. The core-periphery algorithm partitions a 
network into a core that is tightly interconnected 
(1-block), but this measure does not directly 
capture the degree to which this core is a “rich-
club” (as measured by the rich-club coefficient);
2. The core-periphery measure says that the core 
is tightly interconnected and the periphery is 
weakly interconnected; it says less about the link 
between core and periphery (only that it expects 
an imperfect 1-block). The rich club approach 
directly measures how rich nodes are tied to 
non-rich nodes (assortative and disassortative 
mixing).
3. The “core” of a core-periphery structure might 
be very large, while we are assuming that the 
“rich club” is a small group (as measured by the 
power law distribution).
Thus, while core-periphery measures may also provide an 
approximate measure of oligarchical structure, the rich-
club approach offers a more direct and discriminating 
measure of oligarchy. In the next section, we will analyze 
several social networks using this rich-club approach: 
urban infrastructure policy networks in São Paulo, Brazil 
over six mayoral administrations and transportation 
policy networks in two U.S. cities, Chicago and Los 
Angeles. These networks allow us to compare urban 
policy regimes across time in the same city (São Paulo) 
and across city for the same kind of policy domain 
(Chicago and Los Angeles), and across urban regimes in 
two countries (Brazil and the U.S.).
4. Description of the Networks
4.1 São Paulo Urban Infrastructure Networks 
São Paulo is the largest and most important metropolis 
in Brazil and South America, with roughly 11.9 million 
municipal inhabitants and 20 million in the metropolitan 
region. Besides shaping the urban space in São Paulo, 
urban-infrastructure policy is at the core of municipal 
politics and policies, and receives a large share of the 
municipal budget – 13% on average during the period 
1975-2000 (Bichir, 2005). Thus, it is an influential and 
important policy domain. 
 Policy network data was collected by Eduardo 
Marques and Renata Bichir in order to investigate the 
policy dynamics of the Secretariat of Public Roads 
(“Secretaria de Vias Públicas” – SVP), the São Paulo 
municipal agency responsible for urban infrastructure 
policy (Marques, 2003).7 Based on an examination 
of contract notices published in the official press, this 
research analyzed spatial, relational, and political 
dynamics of urban-infrastructure policy in the city of São 
Paulo from 1975 to 2000.8
7 Urban infrastructure policy is a part of a broader “urban engineering” community that encompasses several policy domains, including 
infrastructure, maintenance of the built environment and services, urban transportation, and cleaning (Marques, 2003). The municipal agency 
responsible for urban infrastructure policy depends on the municipal budget, does not have strong institutional boundaries or civil service career 
patterns, and experiences strong migrations from and to other parts of the government and the private sector (Marques, 2003). These institutional 
features affect the policy network and the way policy is formulated and implemented.
8 In Brazil, all government contracts have to be published in official daily publications called “Diários Oficiais.” To obtain information on the 
patterns of investment in urban infrastructure, the data set includes information on almost 5500 urban public works project contracts (road and 
drainage work, river canalization, bridges and tunnel construction etc.) from 1975 to 2000.
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To recreate the policy network from 1975 to 2000, the 
researchers conducted 26 in-depth interviews with career 
officials, technicians, and members of the community of 
engineers associated with SVP. These interviews sought 
to characterize the policy and political dynamics in the 
city over time, as well as to investigate the continuity 
of the networks.9 The interviews used a name generator 
– based on official data of all incumbents of the main 
institutional positions of the Secretariat over time – and 
snowballing techniques, to identify the complete network. 
The network data analyzed in this paper is the data set 
produced by the Marques team using this data collection 
process.
 This policy network was constructed with the aim 
of analyzing the power dynamics inside this bureaucracy 
under different mayors with different political inclinations. 
The study focused on the differences between right-wing 
and left wing parties, since this is a policy area traditionally 
associated with the right in the city of São Paulo.10 The 
relations among different groups of the Secretariat, the 
broader political environment (political parties, other 
public agencies), and private companies responsible for 
public works were investigated. The analysis found that 
this policy community is characterized by the importance 
of personal ties among state actors and between state 
and private sector actors (Marques, 2003, 2012). The 
infrastructure policy network in São Paulo became more 
dense and complex over time, from approximately 75 
interconnected people prior to 1975 to more than 250 
people in the administration of Celso Pitta (1997-2000). 
Marques (2003) found a hegemonic group in control of 
policy across this period, which was stable even during 
the two left-wing administrations (Covas and Erundina) 
despite their attempts to change the power dynamics in 
this policy domain by introducing new players into the 
policy network. These new actors, however, failed to 
displace or break the hold of the hegemonic group.
9 Since this is a relatively stable and close community-many of the technicians studied together in the same universities, have common business 
associations outside the public sector and are co-members of professional associations-the research team assumed that most people would 
know each other, forming a one-mode network. Information on all types of contacts inside the policy community was considered, and not only 
information on ties associated with some specific policy issues or contracts. In this sense, the relationship between two nodes may represent 
several types of ties, including work ties, friendship ties, business ties, etc. The researchers did not exclude people from the network due to 
retirement, only when someone died or went to a completely different sector. The interviews revealed that the retired public servants usually 
went to the private sector and stayed as formal and informal consultants for the public sector. Additional interviews were then conducted in 
order to separate contacts into different periods and to differentiate the types and strength of ties (indicated by the frequency of citation of each 
dyad). These interviews allowed the construction of the network of relationships between individuals, entities and private companies in each 
mayoral administration from 1975 to 2000.
10 The study characterized “right-wing” politicians as belonging to the party that supported the military regime (Arena) and the parties that 
were created after it (PPB and PDS), including a party aligned with them at the municipal level (PTB). Thus, Olavo Setúbal (in charge of the 
municipality from 16/04/1975 to 12/07/1979), Reynaldo de Barros (12/07/1979 to 13/05/1982), Salim Curiati (13/05 / 1982 to 13/05/1983), 
Jânio Quadros (1986 to 1988), Paulo Maluf (1993 to 1996) and Celso Pitta (1997 to 1999) were classified as “right-wing.” “Left-wing” mayors 
were those belonging to the opposition to the military regime – the MDB – and their descendants after the political opening: Mario Covas 
(13/05/1983 to 31/12/1985) and Luiza Erundina (1989 to 1992), who belonged to the PMDB and the PT, respectively.
Chicago and Los Angeles Transportation Policy Networks
Weir et al. (2009) collected data on the transportation 
policy networks of the second and third largest U.S. 
metropolitan regions — Los Angeles (13 million people) 
and Chicago (9 million people). The purpose of the study 
was to investigate whether the 1991 Intermodal Surface 
Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) had created 
conditions for collaboration on transportation policy 
issues among groups operating on an urban and regional 
scale. ISTEA also sought to encourage the participation 
of new groups typically excluded from previous planning 
regimes. In addition to their size, L.A. and Chicago were 
selected because they represent contrasting urban political 
dynamics. L.A. is traditionally regarded as having a very 
fragmented urban and regional politics, while Chicago’s 
active business and civic community and centralized 
political regime make it an example of more organized 
and cohesive policy-making.
 Semi-structured interviews were conducted 
in 2003 with 41 groups active in transportation issues 
in the Los Angeles region and in 2005 with 35 groups 
active in the Chicago region. During these interviews, 
groups were shown a list of organizations involved in 
transportation issues and asked to “check every name on 
the list that your organization has worked with as part 
of its transportation work.” A follow-up question then 
asked respondents to indicate which of these groups they 
had worked with “closely.” The questions were intended 
to capture the difference between “weak” and “strong” 
network ties.
 The study found that ISTEA had encouraged the 
creation of new groups and that these groups brought 
new perspectives to the urban and regional transportation 
policy process. It was also found that these groups were 
engaged in active networking within their regions. The 
interviews, however, also indicated that the groups 
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felt that they were still not fully included in a planning 
process now dominated by the Metropolitan Planning 
Organizations (MPOs) also created by ISTEA. Of the two 
cities, Chicago groups were more successful in getting 
their MPO to be responsive to their input.
5. Comparison of the Networks
As indicated in Table 1, the policy networks vary 
significantly across the three cities. The São Paulo 
networks are much larger than the U.S. networks, but 
also much sparser (e.g., less dense). Since density often 
declines as networks become larger, this is not surprising. 
As the comparison of the “strong” and “weak” tie networks 
in Chicago and L.A. suggests, density is also a reflection 
of the kinds of social relations elicited by interviews and 
surveys. If you ask people to specify only the people they 
work with closely (“strong ties”) then you will generate 
a sparser network than if you ask them whom they have 
worked with (“weak ties”). The differences between the 
networks indicate that it is important to exercise caution 
when making comparisons, since many network measures 
are sensitive to the size and density of the network. In 
Dataset Density
Number 
of Nodes
Number 
of Ties
Average 
Degree
Maximal 
Degree
Shortest Path 
Length Between 
Nodes
Clustering 
Coefficient
Assortative 
Coefficient
São Paulo
Reynaldo 0.030 162 429 5.3 42 3.18 0.279 -0.23
Covas 0.028 198 562 5.67 47 3.23 0.299 -0.196
Janio 0.024 236 686 5.81 51 3.32 0.286 -0.169
Erundina 0.026 209 584 5.59 49 3.37 0.312 -0.179
Maluf 0.028 196 551 5.62 49 3.24 0.321 -0.191
Pitta 0.028 204 586 5.75 49 3.25 0.305 -0.175
Chicago
Chicago – Weak 0.403 35 240 13.71 29 1.62 0.62 -0.16
Chicago – Strong 0.106 33 63 3.82 9 2.91 0.413 -0.013
Los Angeles
LA – Weak 0.359 37 239 12.92 29 1.69 0.519 -0.114
LA – Strong 0.156 38 103 5.42 12 2.49 0.274 0.006
Table 1: Degree, Clustering and Mixing Properties
the analysis that follows, we attempt to normalize our 
measures where possible. 
5.1 The Rich-Club Coefficient
When we look at the distribution of the rich-club 
coefficient as a function of degree (Figures 1 and 2), 
we can see that all the policy networks show a rich-club 
pattern. According to Zhou and Mondragón’s (2004) 
definition, rich nodes are those with the highest degrees 
(much larger than the average degree). The figures 
show that the people with the highest degree are also 
interconnected with each other--the higher the degree, the 
greater the rich club coefficient.11
11 MISSING FOOTNOTE
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5.2 Mixing Properties
Table 1 also shows the findings for the assortative 
coefficient and several other related measures.12 With 
the exception of the Los Angeles strong tie network, all 
the networks are disassortative (r < 0). This means that 
nodes with dissimilar degree tend to be connected to each 
other, i.e. well-connected nodes tend to be connected 
to poorly-connected nodes and vice-versa (Zhou and 
Mondragón, 2007; Colizza et al, 2006). In the case of São 
Paulo, it is interesting to note that the Reynaldo regime is 
the most disassortative (r = -0.230), which is consistent 
with Marques’s finding that a hegemonic group is first 
established during this administration. The disassortative 
coefficients, however, are quite similar across the 
different administrations in São Paulo, regardless of their 
ideological inclination. This finding is consistent with the 
argument that the hegemonic group, once established, is 
quite stable (Marques 2003). 
5.3 Degree Distribution 
We can also contrast the São Paulo networks with 
the US networks by looking at degree distribution in 
these networks. The degree distribution is indicative 
of a network’s global connectivity, although different 
properties/mixing patterns may be found in networks 
sharing the same degree distribution (Zhou and 
Mondragón, 2007). One important type of degree 
distribution is a “power law” distribution, in which many 
nodes have only a few links and a small number of nodes 
have a very large number of links (Zhou and Mondragón, 
2007).
 When we look at Figures 3, we see the degree 
distributions approximate a power law, where there are 
few nodes with a large number of connections, but most 
nodes have few connections. Compared with the Chicago 
and LA networks (Figure 4), the São Paulo networks 
more closely resemble a power law distribution.
6. Analysis
Four bases of comparison are presented by our three 
urban policy networks. The São Paulo data allows us 
to examine regime-level properties over time — across 
different municipal administrations. The Chicago and 
Los Angeles data allow us to compare policy network 
regimes in two different American cities, while holding 
12 Each of the São Paulo networks contains multiple components. In the rich club analysis, we only considered the giant component, which is 
the largest component in a network. The giant component contains more than 90% of the nodes in these networks. All other analyses consider 
entire networks.
policy sector constant. The Chicago and Los Angeles 
data also allows us to compare weak and strong tie 
networks within each city (and, to some degree, to draw 
generalizations about the character of weak and strong 
ties in both cities). Finally, we can cautiously contrast a 
Brazilian urban policy network against U.S. urban policy 
networks.
 All three policy networks show some tendencies 
towards oligarchical organization. All of them demonstrate 
a “rich-club” organization, where the best-connected 
individuals or organizations are connected to other well-
connected people and groups. With the exception of the 
Los Angeles strong tie network, however, all the networks 
are disassortative, meaning that the well-connected are 
also connected to the less well-connected. This is to be 
expected in an oligarchic network, where the inner elite 
collectively intermediate the social network as a whole.
While all these networks may have oligarchical tendencies, 
the São Paulo networks are more clearly oligarchical than 
either of the American networks. The São Paulo networks 
are more disassortative than the American networks, 
particularly the strong tie networks. This means that 
the São Paulo elite has strong links to the entire policy 
network, while elites in the American networks are less 
broad-based. To some degree, this makes us reflect upon 
the concept of oligarchy we have embraced. Is a regime 
more oligarchical if the elite (e.g., the well-connected) 
organize the broader network or ignore it? In the 
Michelsian tradition, the former qualifies, but we might 
consider whether the latter case also represents a form 
of oligarchy. The fact that the strong tie networks in the 
American cities are less disassortative than the weak tie 
networks suggest that when it comes to the closest ties, 
the American networks are more clubbish. 
 There is another more important reason, however, 
to question the oligarchical qualities of the American 
networks. The well-structured power law distribution 
of the São Paulo networks indicates that there is a small 
“inner circle” that monopolizes most of the network. By 
contrast, in the American cities, this “inner circle” is not 
well differentiated. In the weak tie networks, in particular, 
a rather large group of institutions are well-connected, 
suggesting more of a pluralist than an oligarchical regime. 
In other words, there are well-connected organizations but 
no small group of elite that monopolize ties. The strong 
tie networks appear closer to power law distributions, 
suggesting a more distinct elite. But even these networks 
do not differentiate between a small well-connected elite 
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and a less well-connected periphery. 
 Our analysis concludes that the São Paulo 
networks come much closer to being oligarchies than do 
the American networks. While the American networks 
have some oligarchical tendencies, they ultimately 
appear more pluralistic. Well-connected organizations 
in the American networks are clubbish, but the analysis 
does not suggest that this elite is very well differentiated. 
Without studying other Brazilian cities, it is difficult 
to confidently conclude that these contrasts represent 
national differences in urban policy networks. But the 
contrast suggests that this is a distinct possibility. One 
thing that is clear from the data, however, is that the 
Brazilian oligarchy appears to be stable across municipal 
administrations, a point that reinforces the argument 
made by Marques (2003) about these networks. Different 
political parties were in charge during these different 
administrations, so it is striking to find this stability. There 
is a sharp disjuncture in the distribution of the rich-club 
coefficient at higher degrees during the first left-wing 
administration (Covas) that probably reflects an attempt 
to destabilize the oligarchy. But the distribution returns to 
the prior pattern under the next left-wing administration 
(Erundina).
 The contrast between Chicago and Los Angeles 
was less striking than we anticipated, though in the 
expected direction. As mentioned, Los Angeles is reputed 
to be a civically fragmented city, while Chicago has a 
reputation for more civic cohesion. The distribution of 
the rich-club coefficient by degree (Figure 2) is very 
similar: in both cities, the well-connected are strongly 
linked to one another. The Los Angeles networks are less 
disassociative than the Chicago networks, suggesting 
that that the well-connected organizations in Los Angeles 
are less well-connected to the wider network. This could 
be one indicator of greater fragmentation in the Los 
Angeles networks. For the strong tie networks, Chicago 
also appears somewhat closer to a power law distribution 
(many organizations with few ties; a few organizations 
with many ties) than the Los Angeles network; in Los 
Angeles, many organizations have a medium range of 
ties. Our conclusion is that there is a less distinctive elite 
in Los Angeles. For the weak tie networks, however, this 
contrast is less clear. 
 
7. Conclusion
The concept of oligarchy has an illustrious history in 
the social sciences, but is only weakly developed as 
an analytical concept. Though it is not uncommon to 
hear the word used to describe political and economic 
regimes in organizations, social movements, and nations, 
the precise meaning of the concept is often suggestive 
rather than precise. In this paper, we provide a structural 
analysis of the concept based on social network analysis. 
Building on the classic treatment of oligarchy by 
Michels, we begin with a conception of oligarchy as a 
social structure organized and dominated by a small 
inner circle of prominent actors tightly interconnected 
among themselves. These “oligarchs” are linked to less 
prominent actors in the network, who are only weakly 
interconnected among themselves. The power of an 
oligarchy lies in the cohesion of the oligarchs, their ability 
to organize less prominent actors, and the weakness of 
these less prominent actors to organize themselves.
Our main contribution is to operationalize this idea using 
a “rich club” approach. The social network concept of a 
“rich club” captures the idea that well-connected actors 
(high degree) are also connected among themselves. 
The “mixing properties” of a rich-club network indicate 
whether well-connected actors are only connected to 
each other (assortative) or to less well-connected actors 
(disassortative). Finally, by evaluating whether the 
network fits a power law distribution (few actors of high 
degree; many actors of low degree), we can determine 
whether the inner-circle is a small or large group relative 
to the size of the network.
 We demonstrate the efficacy of this approach by 
analyzing and comparing several urban networks. Our 
analysis of São Paulo, Chicago, and Los Angeles suggests 
that policy networks have oligarchical tendencies, in the 
sense that well-connected actors in all three cities tend 
to be connected to other well-connected actors. The São 
Paulo networks, the weak tie networks in Chicago and 
Los Angeles, and the Chicago strong tie network are 
also disassortative, meaning that the well-connected 
actors are connected to less well-connected actors. 
However, only the São Paulo networks demonstrate a 
clear power law distribution, indicating a small coterie 
of well-connected actors. We conclude that the São Paulo 
networks come closest to being oligarchical regimes, 
while the Chicago and Los Angeles networks are more 
pluralist. Remarkably, the oligarchical structure of the 
São Paulo networks is stable across several municipal 
administrations, suggesting that oligarchy, once formed, 
may be a robust form of political organization. 
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